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Abstract: 
This paper studies the effects of the change of voting scheme on the market prices of 
Electrolux and SKF AB using standard event study methodology and a clinical approach. 
The economic effect of the voting scheme change is assessed using the market model. We 
investigate the loss of control due to the change of the voting scheme. The degree of the 
change of power is calculated using Shapley power index (SPI) and Banzhaf power index. 
There is a wealth transfer from the high vote shareholders to low vote shareholders in the 
process since in both cases the high power shareholders required no compensation. We 
expect that share price to have a positive response to such an announcement due to the 
reduced power discount and corporate governance improvement.  The magnitude of the 
response on the event day depends also on the information structure of the period leading to 
the announcement. A bigger effect on the value of the firm is to be expected if the voting 
powers of the major owner(s) shifts away from absolute control to moderate control which 
indicating a significant change in governance pattern.  
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1 Corporate Governance: Theories and 
Hypothesis 
 
1.1 Agency theory and corporate governance 
 
Corporate governance is not relevant in a world without agency cost. It is relevant if and 
only if there is agency cost and incomplete contract (Olive Hart, 1996). Who makes 
residual decision and how to govern firms efficiently comprise the main tasks of corporate 
governance. 
Agency theory1 provides a framework to analyze the effects of separation of ownership and 
control, and provides effective tools to solve the principal-agent problem generated by 
conflicts of interests2.  Under an effective governance system, the board and the executive 
management are expected to act according to their best judgment on corporate affairs, this 
does not guarantee a perfect match with outside shareholders’ interests3. Conflicts of 
interests between controlling owners as agents and other shareholders as principal generate 
agency costs that both parties as rational self-interested people have incentives to reduce in 
order to generate firm value. Agency theory provides a general structure therein a variety of 
classes of solutions to these problems contain. Empirical studies drawn from corporate 
practices have provided examples of linkage between corporate governance and value 
creation. It has enriched the theory and practices of corporate governance4.  
                                                 
1 The origin of modern agency theory can be retrieved as far as Adam Smith’s “the Wealth of Nations”, 1776, “the 
directors of such companies…cannot be well expected…Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail…”.  
More recently, see Berle and Means, 1932, on separation of ownership and control. 
2 The ways to minimize agency costs are through better information disclosure, promotion of shareholder activism, and 
better small shareholder protection, and other market disciplinary mechanisms.  
3 This refers to agency cost both generated by conflict of interests and lack of self-control, see, Michael C. Jensen, 1994. 
4 Miron Stano, 1976, shows that, in US, shareholders of owner-controlled firms have been provided with a significantly 
higher rate of return than shareholders of management controlled firms. See, for example, Peter Dodd and J. B. Warner, 
1983, for a study of proxy contest, Demsetz and Lehn, 1985, for an empirical test on Berle and Means theory. For more 
recent studies, see James S. Ang, et al. 2000, Hauser and Lauterbach, 2000. 
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1.2 Jensen-Meckling Model:  REMM model5 of human behaviour 
Jensen and Meckling (1994) describes an economic agent/individual as resourceful, 
evaluative and maximizing (REM). They are capable of making trade-offs among different 
goods. They are interested not only in material goods but also in intangible goods such as 
respect, honesty, love, fame, morality and immortality. This theory departs from Economic 
Model (Money Maximizing Model), Sociological Model (Social Victim Model) and 
Political Model (Perfect Agent Model) by adding new dimensions in evaluating human 
behavior. An individual falls short of a perfect agent (as in Political Model) since a ‘perfect 
agent’ is deemed as a robot that has all the capability of a man except one flaw: his own 
self-interest. On the contrary, an individual in REMM has his own self-interest and is 
resourceful, evaluative and maximizing but imperfect. A typical agent in REMM has his 
own desires and wants and is perfectly willing to make trade-offs. Self-interested individual 
in the REM model has the capacity for altruism, cares about others and take other people’s 
interests into account while maximizing his own welfare. REMM provides a sound and 
flexible predictive framework for evaluating human behavior. REMM is consistent with 
agency theory because there are conflicts of interests between agent and principal in 
REMM. REMM explains human behavior. It assumes that each individual is always willing 
to give up some sufficiently small amount of any particular good for some sufficiently large 
amount of other goods. Agency Theory aims at solving the principal-agent problem 
(minimize the agency cost not eliminate) by improving corporate governance that is based 
on understanding of human behavior. For example, a typical agent might maximize his own 
self-interest taking into account that other people get minimum of their shares. Or he might 
harm other people’s interest by increasing the risk of the firm and benefit from the 
volatility. This clearly calls for corporate governance to work. 
Power is a common good that derives positive utility for the individual possessing it. 
Voting rights are power to run the firm. There is a market for power and an equilibrium 
price for it in order for the “power market” to function well. Exchange of the power should 
                                                 
5 In Jensen and Meckling, The Nature of Man, 1994, an individual is characterized as REM, i.e., resourceful, evaluative 
and maximizing. 
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be priced in terms of the amount of power being transferred, the resulting power structure 
and the total value of the firm after the transaction. In general, the higher the expected 
benefit of power, the higher the market price of power6. There are cases where the power is 
locked in and not subject to contest, e.g., extreme cases where firms have an absolute 
controlling owner (s). This provides room for corporate governance improvements and 
market disciplinary forces to work, e.g., shareholder activism, market pricing mechanism.  
It is widely recognized that active owner control and entrepreneurship in Sweden have 
contributed to a major industry boom and laid foundation for long-term economic growth in 
Sweden (Rolf Carlsson, 2001). An absolute controlling owner in this case is not that 
controlling at all. He or she often takes into account of others’ interests other than his or her 
private benefits7, sometimes even counter his or her private benefits for the benefit of the 
firm. There obviously exists altruistic behavior during the early stages much like parents 
nurture young child. REM model is therefore relevant in explaining the Swedish case. 
In this paper, active owners’ strategic decision of voting scheme change is evaluated under 
the framework of shareholder wealth redistribution, the power redistribution of the owners 
and the implicit trade-offs. The trade-off is made through exchanging sufficiently big 
amount of power with sufficiently big amount of other goods: management’s inner 
propensity to thrive for excellence, improve outside shareholder relationship, to compete 
for capital, to comply with domestic and international rules, and to re-balance portfolio 
composition of the main owners. This study also has policy implications on the issue of 
facilitating the market for corporate control. EU proposal of one-share one-vote has met 
strong resistance from countries with dual-class of shares notably Sweden8 for the concern 
that a uniform one-share one-vote would change the current Swedish corporate power 
structure and ownership of the large Swedish firms which can be potentially harmful for 
Swedish national interests. In addition, this study provides a unique method in using power 
index to quantify the controlling shareholders change of power and its economic value.  
                                                 
6 In Hauser and Lauterbach, 2000, where 67 dual class stock unifications are studied, they found out that the 
compensation to loss of power and price of vote depend strongly on the position and perspective of the majority 
shareholders. 
7 Economic benefits derived from control. 
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1.3 Model of owner control  
Consider a model of ownership and control. A strong owner owns a majority of votes and 
can decide on all the important issues concerning a firm. He has reputation capital (R) and 
social capital (S), which restricts him from harming the firm. His utility function is twice 
differentiable and concave. Ui =U(S) +U(R) +U(V) + U(H) where V is the votes, and H is 
the income stream he gets from his shareholdings and i denotes the owner. 
At each period, the controlling owner convinces the stockholders to entrust their funds to 
him by promising to increase the value of the firm. When the firm performs well, the other 
shareholders are quiet. But when the firm performs bad, the other shareholders investigate 
by going through company accounts and/or sell their shares. Under such situation, the share 
price falls and he decides to give some control rights back. If he gives the votes for free, he 
will gain some social capital and reputation capital d(S)+d(R) but lose his voting power 
d(V). And the value of the voting change will be equally spread over both the A and B 
share owners. If he demands fair compensation, he will be compensated for the value of the 
votes he gives up according to the market value of the votes. The change of his social 
capital and reputation capital is 0.  
 
1.4 Evaluate the voting change 
Electrolux AB and SKF AB were two of the core holdings of the well-known Swedish 
family, the Wallenberg Sphere9. Wallenberg family exercises active ownership through its 
holding company Investor10.   
                                                                                                                                                    
8 Dual-class of shares is not in conflict with an effective takeover market except absolute control and where there is no 
market for high voting shares. 
9 See Håkan Lindgren, 1994. Wallenberg sphere refers to a group of firms in which the Wallenberg family has exercised 
some form of active ownership either via providing members to serve on the Board of Directors or direct management. 
10 See Sven-Olof Collin, 1998, for a definition of business group. Business group is defined as a supra-organization 
consisting of legally independent firms joined together by some mechanism, particularly by equity ownership, and 
coordinating the use of one or more resources. For example, benefits of information sharing and sharing of an internal 
capital market among other things. 
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Active owner control adds value to the firm, but absolute control using voting difference 
decreases the value of the firm through the power discount. Thus, the economic value of 
reducing voting difference is expected to be positive because it is viewed as a corporate 
governance improvement. The loss of power of the controlling owner without direct 
compensation indicates transfer of wealth from controlling owner to shareholders holding 
lower voting shares. The total economic value of the voting change is composed of two 
parts: the value due to reduced expected agency cost plus the would-be compensation to the 
A share owners. The reduced expected agency cost is the additional increase in the market 
value of the firm. The transfer of wealth is, therefore, the percentage of the lower vote 
shares (B) over the total amount of shares (A+B) times the amount of the would-be 
compensation to the high vote shareholders. Suppose two classes of shares A and B. Total 
amount of A share is A, total amount of B share is B, the compensation to the A share 
owners is V(C), then, the wealth transfer from the A share owners to B share owners is  
(B/ (A+B)) *V(C) 
where V(C) is determined by the price difference of the A and B shares, Pa-Pb, the change 
of B shares voting rights from 1/1000 to 1/10, the amount of shares of each class, A and B. 
Assuming the marginal vote price we observe on the market equals to the equilibrium vote 
price and there is no liquidity premium associated with high vote shares, then, the marginal 
value of 1% vote is11 
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In reality there can be negative voting premium as in case of SKF, where we set the 
compensation as 0. The negative premium can be due to lack of trading interest in A shares.  
The new voting structure of A and B shareholding is (Va, Vb), Va is the proportion of the 
total vote assigned to A shares, Vb is the proportion of the total vote assigned to B shares. 
                                                 
11 See the calculation in detail in Hauser and Lauterbach, 2000. 
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the total compensation to A share owners is (1) times (2). 
 The loss of votes (%) of the controlling owners in the case of Electrolux: 
93,6%-22,3% = 71,3 % 
The loss of votes (%) of the controlling owners in the case of SKF 
32,1%-28,42% = 3,68% 
The price premium of Electrolux A share over the 3 month period towards the voting 
change is 3,03% (see graph 6 in attachment). 1 percentage of voting loss corresponds to 
0,000857841 % of equity gain. The compensation would be 223964 Electrolux B shares. 
The approximate value is 31,33 Million Swedish Kronor. 
SKF has a negative premium during the period indicating a 0 premium (see graph 7 in 
attachment). However the amount of compensation to the loss of the voting power should 
be, the actual compensation of A-share holders of both companies is none. An arbitrageur 
would make money by selling his B shares and buys A share for the same amount of 
investment, and end up making a gain after the voting scheme change. Since the premium 
is expected to be larger after the voting change. 
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2 Methodology  
 
We employ clinical study (R. H. Carlsson, 2000) methods to the two events of voting 
scheme changes. Clinical study method is best suited when few observations are 
available12.  We use stock market value change as the measure to the economic value of the 
voting change. The market model is used to estimate the economic gains (Appendix A: 
Event Study Methodology).  
The power of the controlling owner is calculated by Shapley-Shubik power indices 
(Shapley, 1953; Shapley and Shubik, 1954) and Banzhaf power indices (Banzhaf, 1965).  
The calculation is based on all possible voter permutations, from which all the decisive 
positions for a voter i is analyzed. The sum of all the decisive positions is divided by all 
possible orderings (voter permutations) giving voter i's share on all pivots (decisive 
positions). Formally voter i's Shapley-Shubik index value is calculated as  
( ) ( ) ( ) {}( )[ ]iSvSv
n
sns
NS
i /!
!!1 −−−= ∑
⊆
φ  
 
Each swing is given a weight of ( ) ( )
!
!!1
n
sns −− , the power index value for i is then obtained 
by adding up all the weights. s is the number of actors in S, n is the total number of voters 
in the voting body. The Shapley-Shubik power indices add up to 1. 
The standardized Banzhaf index, or the normalized Banzhaf index was introduced two 
decades after Shapley-Shubik index by John F. Banzhaf (Banzhaf 1965). The standardized 
Banzhaf index value for voter i is obtained by dividing the sum of i's swings (regarding all 
possible 2n combinations) by the sum of all voters' all swings hence giving i's proportion of 
all swings. Formally voter i's standardized Banzhaf index is calculated as  
 
                                                 
12 The depth of discussion often offsets the defects of lack of statistical significance. 
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The difference of these two indices are that Banzhaf Power indices calculate how many 
times the voter can swing and change the winning coalition to a losing one. We use 
standard Banzhaf indices where all the power indices assigned to voters in the game sum up 
to 1. Shapley indices calculate how many times the voter are pivotal in all possible 
permutations of a winning coalition. Note that the voting game described here is non-
cooperative. 
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3 The case of Electrolux 
Electrolux AB and SKF AB, implemented voting scheme changes in 1998 and 1999 
respectively. The voting difference after change complies with the Swedish Company Act 
which set the highest voting difference to 1: 1/10 among common stocks. 
3.1 Background study  
Electrolux AB was established in 1912 by Swedish salesman Axel Wenner-Gren and it 
became a Wallenberg company under the leadership of Marcus Wallenberg (MW) in 1959, 
one of the many excellent acquisitions13 accomplished by generations of Wallenberg family 
leaders. Due to some mysterious reasons, Marcus Wallenberg (MW) was offered a 
dominating stock post by the founder of Electrolux, which amounted to 70 percent of the 
voting rights14. MW took the opportunity in the belief that Electrolux and Asea together 
could create synergies and enhance value15.  
From the late 19th century to the 20th century, the acquisition of many industrial firms had 
transformed Wallenberg sphere to an industrial group. Its holding company Investor 
introduced in 1916 and Förvaltnings AB Providentia in 1945 due to regulatory reasons have 
developed into industrial holding companies. Incentive founded in 1963 was intended to 
buy and develop small companies with interesting technology in cooperation with research. 
It acted also as a vehicle to restructure companies with possible gains through 
rationalization. Constant renewing and constant value enhancing as the group’s deep-rooted 
tradition have been practiced constantly and the result has been extraordinary (R. H. 
Carlsson, 2001)16. It has facilitated numerous ownership reshuffling. Active ownership has 
differentiated Investor AB from other institutional owners such as insurance companies and 
                                                 
13 Acquisitions of Stora in 1870s, Scania and  Astra in 1924,  Ericsson in 1932, SKF 1932, WM data in 1994, to mention 
but a few. 
14The main part was placed under AB Separator, in 1962 transferred to Asea, the remainder was assumed by MW, 
Investor and Providentia. See Investor, 1916-1991. 
15 Asea’s daughter company Helios was transferred to Electrolux in exchange for new share emission. 
16 There are, however, other opinions based on the rate of return to shareholders where Investor AB, among all 8 
investment companies, rank the last, see article: Investor sämst - och dyrast, by Simon Blecher, Affärsvärlden Nr. 17, 
2003. 
Yinghong Chen, 2003, Valuation of Voting Scheme Changes 
 12
mutual funds. Investor AB as the working horse of the Wallenberg Sphere has itself a 
highly concentrated control profile (41,7% voting rights and 19,6% shareholding) (see also 
graph 3 in attachment for the concentration of power of the biggest owners) thus enabling 
the control of the other companies within the Wallenberg sphere.  
There were, however, practical reasons for the voting schemes to change in the Wallenberg 
group companies besides the openly-stated need to attract international investments and 
improve the company’s governance structure. Incentive AB was seeking an exit from 
owning 48,3% of the voting rights ( see table 1) and merging into medical technology 
company Gambro AB. The massive voting rights became an obstacle for Investor AB to 
acquire the holding. By relaxing the high voting ratio Investor could acquire Electrolux 
shares from Incentive AB without having to consolidate Electrolux into its balance sheet. 
From inside, Investor AB needed to minimize its power discount imposed on its net asset 
value. The discount was estimated at about 14% of Investor’s net asset value as of Feb. the 
10th, 1998, a phenomenon usually associated with mutual funds. To reach its goal of 
shrinking and eventually eliminate the power discount, Investor has resorted to increase its 
overall risk and concentrate on major holdings and its core competence area. This, 
however, has not worked to reduce the power discount. One way to change that image is to 
lower the power distance of the dual-class of shares. If that is the goal then the effort is 
bitterly failed since the level of the power discount has increased to around 30% of its net 
asset value as of year 2001. However the risk tied up to Investor is more related to 
information asymmetry, meaning that there can be highly risky investments, that is, out of 
balance sheet activities and agency cost associated with control. 
Public opinion perceived the almost non-existent voting rights of B shares as increasingly 
negative, particularly investors in the international market17. 
After the change, the company’s voting scheme would be brought in line with the current 
Swedish Company Act which allows 1 to 1:10 voting difference. The liquidity of the A-
shares would also improve partly due to the expected additional demand to the higher 
voting shares, partly due to the prospect of an outsider gaining a corner position in the 
                                                 
17 Foreign ownership accounts for 59,9% share capital of Electrolux AB by Feb. 1998, mostly held by unknown foreign 
owners and trustees. 
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company. All factors considered it was in favor of the change of the voting scheme. We 
expect the change of the voting scheme have a positive effect on the price movement of 
Electrolux shares. 
Market reaction to the news 
According to the press release of March 10, 1998, the Board of directors had proposed for 
an amendment of the Articles of Association that will give each B-share 1/10 of a vote 
instead of 1/1000 and A-share with 1 vote. Upon the news release, Electrolux share posted 
a 3,57% gain.  
The proposal was approved at the 1998 ASM (04/29) of Electrolux AB18. The change of 
the voting scheme was not unexpected due to the announcement of the agenda on the 10th 
of March. As a result, the share of the total voting rights in the Company represented by B-
shares increased from 3,4% to 78,1%, and the share of A-shares decreased from 96,4% to 
21,9%. An unchanged dividend of 2,5 SEK per share and an authorization of a stock split 
of 1:5 were approved in accordance with the Board proposal. The first day of the new par 
value and the new voting rights of the shares to be quoted on SSE is 2nd of June. This 
suggests three event dates. The first date is when the expectation of a voting change was 
formed. The second date has multiple events of a confirmation of the expected events in 
combination with the first quarter result. The third date is the date for the listing of the new 
voting rights and the new par value in the stock market.  
 
The event time line: 
 
 
 
 
 
The announcement of 
the voting change, 
April 29th.  
The day of listing 
with new voting 
rights, June, 2nd. 
 t=0  t=1 
The announcement 
of the agenda 
March, 10th.  
 t=-1 
Yinghong Chen, 2003, Valuation of Voting Scheme Changes 
 14
The effect has been built up since the release of the agenda of the annual shareholder 
meeting given that the board’s proposal had a good chance to be endorsed by the ASM. 
This has largely been priced in the stock by the time it was confirmed. Conditional event 
methodology19 should be applied here. This would mean that the effect at the 
announcement day ought to be not as strong as what it would have been had it been a 
totally unexpected event. 
Graph 1 shows the stock price movement of Electrolux around the event period. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The data has been modified to calculate the model parameters20 since the trading volume of 
A-shares was extremely thin and un-continuous. This phenomenon was due to the fact that 
                                                                                                                                                    
18 A qualified majority of both A and B shares were required at the AGM. 
19 Prabhala, 1997. 
20 The no trading day data has been filled by smoothing out the two nearest trading price. 
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the largest 25 shareholders own 99,1% of the A-shares outstanding. Thus, the liquidity of A 
shares are extremely low comparing to B shares, the voting premium of A shares is 
determined by the demand for A-shares for control reason (the expected probability of a 
takeover) and the liquidity of the A shares. The low liquidity could partly explain the 
depressed price of the stocks (Roger Huang and Hans Stoll, 1997). The average daily 
trading volume of A and B shares on the SSE is shown below (in thousands of SEK): 
Table 0: average daily trading volume of Electrolux A and B-shares 
 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 
A-Shares 89 17 27 9 58 
B-Shares 136353 130378 64441 77736 93720 
Total 136442 130395 64468 77745 93788 
*data source: Electrolux AB annual report of 1998. 
3.2 The loss of control analysis using Shapley-Shubik and 
Banzhaf indices 
A simple voting ratio and a power indices measure of voting rights of the shareholders are 
presented in Table 1 and Table 2. It is obvious that the voting power of the controlling 
owner has reduced from absolute voting control (power equals to 1) to a block voter 
meaning any winning coalition would include the controlling owner (Burgin and Shapley, 
2000).   
Table 1: the change of voting structure of Electrolux AB (ownership data of 1998, 02, 16) 
  Votes before Votes after Share Capital 
Incentive 48,3% 11% 1,4% 
Investor 45,3% 11,3% 2,5% 
Wallenberg Sphere 93,6% 22,3% 3,9% 
Fjärde AP-fonden 0,3% 5,8% 7,3% 
SPP 0,1% 2,1% 2,3% 
Skandia 1,1% 2,1% 2,3% 
*data source: Owners and power in Sweden’s listed companies, 1999. 
**Investor and Incentive are two holding companies of Wallenberg sphere. 
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By examining the biggest shareholders’ relative voting power using Power Indices, we 
identify a moderate change in the voting pattern. The big owner lost absolute control in 
qualified majority voting but retained control in simple majority voting provided by 
Shapley and Banzhaf index, given that small owners (each owns less than 0,1% of the 
shares) are not interested in voting.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2
Before the change of the voting scheme After the change of the voting scheme
Electrolux owner name  votes Shapley 1 Shapley2 Banzhaf 1 Banzhaf2  votes Shapley Shapley2 Banzhaf 1 Banzhaf2
1998 Feb. MWC=1/2 MWC=2/3 MWC=1/2 MWC=2/3 MWC=1/2 MWC=2/3 MWC=1/2 MWC=2/3
1 Wallenberg-sfären* 0,94 1 1 1 1 0,223 1 0,683 1 0,561
2 Skandia 0,011 0 0 0 0 0,021 0 0,036 0 0,056
3 SHB-sfären 0,006 0 0 0 0 0,003 0 0,005 0 0,007
4 Fjärde AP-Fonden 0,003 0 0 0 0 0,058 0 0,096 0 0,090
5 SPP 0,001 0 0 0 0 0,023 0 0,041 0 0,062
6 S-E-B-sfären 0,001 0 0 0 0 0,014 0 0,023 0 0,036
7 S-E-Bankens Aktiefonder 0,001 0 0 0 0 0,013 0 0,021 0 0,033
8 Templeton Growth Fund Ltd 0 0 0 0 0 0,01 0 0,016 0 0,025
9 Merrill Lynch fonder (USA) 0 0 0 0 0 0,006 0 0,009 0 0,015
10 Schroder investment 0 0 0 0 0 0,004 0 0,006 0 0,010
11 GMO international funds 0 0 0 0 0 0,004 0 0,006 0 0,010
12 Fidelity fonder 0 0 0 0 0 0,004 0 0,006 0 0,010
13 Lazard fonder(USA) 0 0 0 0 0 0,004 0 0,006 0 0,010
14 AIM fonder (USA) 0 0 0 0 0 0,002 0 0,003 0 0,005
15 Prudential fonder (USA) 0 0 0 0 0 0,001 0 0,002 0 0,003
16 Konsumentkooperationen 0 0 0 0 0 0,009 0 0,014 0 0,023
17 SHB:s aktiefonder 0 0 0 0 0 0,008 0 0,013 0 0,020
18 AMF sjukförsäkring AB 0 0 0 0 0 0,009 0 0,014 0 0,023
* Incentive and Investor owns 48,3% and 45,7% respectively.
note:
1. Data source is Ägarna och Makten, 1998.
2.MWC stands for minimal winning coalition.
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Overall, Investor’s decision to eliminate the extreme type of voting scheme, a big step 
towards one-share one-vote system received much credit from the public. It was 
nevertheless a calculated move since it would not lose control in the near term even though 
an absolute control was replaced with a veto control ( Nevertheless, the possibility of an 
outside interest for acquiring a corner position in the company has increased as shown by 
the increased voting premium (see graph 1). This is consistent with Rydqvist Kristian 
(1996) that the voting premium increases as the power of the biggest owner decreases.  
Table 3 shows the abnormal return of the 11-day window and the significance of the 
abnormal return around the release of the news of the voting scheme change. 
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Table 3
The effect of voting scheme change on APRIL 29th, 1998 
as evaluated by the sample period 250 trading days before the event period. 
11 day window
Event day
4-22 4-23 4-24 4-27 4-28 4-29 4-30 5-4 5-5 5-6 5-7
t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 CAR
Return on Electrolux A -0,0079 -0,0080 0,0101 0,0100 0,0099 0,0098 0,0167 -0,0033 0,0000 -0,0263 0,0135 0,0243
Return on Electrolux B 0,0237 -0,0518 -0,0144 -0,0365 0,0288 0,0339 0,0434 0,0417 0,0067 -0,0066 -0,0147 0,0542
Return on General index -0,0210 -0,0059 -0,0059 -0,0253 0,0167 -0,0084 0,0128 0,0207 -0,0023 0,0122 -0,0043 -0,0106
AR for Electrolux A -0,0059 -0,0085 0,0096 0,0127 0,0056 0,0097 0,0131 -0,0082 -0,0011 -0,0298 0,0128 0,0101
Significance level (-0,747) (-0,762) (0,863) (1,897)* (0,385) (0,912) (0,928) (-0,538) (-0,092) (-2,127)** (1,123)
AR for Electrolux B 0,0499 -0,0446 -0,0072 -0,0050 0,0077 0,0442 0,0272 0,0156 0,0094 -0,0221 -0,0094 0,0657
Significance level 3,721)*** (-2,363)** (-0,379) (-0,436) (0,308) 2,444)** (1,135) (0,603) (0,470) (-0,927) (-0,486)
the critical value of the t distribution, two sided test, for n>100 is 1,645(10%), 1,96(5%) and  2,576(1%).
Table 3c
the effect of the subsequent period of listing with new par value and voting rights
5-25 5-26 5-27 5-28 5-29 6-2 6-3 6-4 6-5 6-8 6-9
t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 CAR
Electrolux A -0,0034 0,0172 -0,0167 0,0116 0,0103 0,0115 0,0350 -0,0011 0,0118 0,0134 -0,0190 0,0706
Significance level (-0,244) (1,4121) (-2,001)** (0,997) (0,816) (1,006) (2,954)*** (-0,095) (0,746) (0,947) (-1,485)
Electrolux B -0,0073 0,0107 -0,0051 0,0167 -0,0069 0,0116 0,0051 -0,0230 -0,0352 -0,0204 -0,0086 -0,0623
Significance level (-0,306) (0,517) (-0,357) (0,846) (-0,319) (0,601) (0,254) (-1,148) (-1,311) (-0,843) (-0,396)
the critical value of the t distribution, two sided test, for n>100 is 1,645(10%), 1,96(5%) and  2,576(1%).
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The sample period is 250 days before the event period. The market model is used to 
estimate the estimated normal return by using the sample period standard deviation to 
calculate the event day standard deviation conditioned on the market return. The abnormal 
return is calculated and a significance test is performed. 
Interpretation of the regression result  There were significant event period 
gains as shown in Table 3. Electrolux A-shares was not traded on the event day in this 
event window. There was moderate movement in consistent to the price of B-shares after 
the trading resumed. B-shares posted a 4,42% abnormal return on the event day (t=0). The 
cumulated abnormal return of the 11-day event window is 6,57 percentage point. There is a 
time lag between the release of the news and the actual day of the new votes to be listed on 
the SSE, which was June the 2nd, A-shares responded significantly on the first trading day 
with the new votes (See table 3c). The cumulated abnormal return of the 11-day event 
window is 7,05 percentage point. After the reintroduction with the new votes, the Premium 
of A-share increased significantly indicating an increased liquidity of A-shares and the 
voting premium increase due to the new profile of voting and lowered grip on the control 
(Rydqvist Kristian, 1996). 
 
4 The case of SKF 
4.1 Background study 
The other two firms in Sweden having the extreme voting scheme were SKF (Aktiebologet 
Svenska Kullagerfabriken) and Ericsson (L.M.Ericsson). SKF AB reversed the extreme 
voting scheme in 1999 after being rejected by the controlling owner Investor at 1998 ASM.  
A little less-known fact is that the major owner vetoed the proposal of a free converting 
right from A-share to B-share.  
Established in 1907 based on Sven Winquist (1876-1953), one of its original founder’s 
invention of single-row ball bearing, SKF was to become the global leading ball bearing 
manufacturer (82% of the bearings market). Wallenberg family had 9% voting rights before 
the Kreuger crash in 1932 while Skandinaviska Banken held 17% of voting rights 
(Investor, 1916-1991). The merger of Stockholms Enskilda Bank and  Skandinaviska
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Banken took place in 1971. At Dec. 31, 1999, SKF accounted for 2% of Investor’s core 
holding (Rolf Carlsson, 2001). 
The timing of the change of the voting scheme coincided with a time of industrial down 
turn. SKF had been losing market shares and profit margin due to vigorous competition in 
its product market. The company was forced to reduce dividend payment by 60% 
comparing to the year before 1999. The market had been expecting a turn around this year 
since the stock price increased some 35% already since the turn of the year. The Annual 
Shareholder Meeting was scheduled at the 1999 ASM, on 22nd April.  
Market reaction    The market reacted positively to the change of voting scheme proposed 
by the board of directors and endorsed by the ASM. The share price of A and B advanced 
11,29% and 11,97% respectively the day the proposal was approved by the ASM. The 
abnormal return of SKF A and B shares are 10,91 % and 11,59% respectively. The change 
has appeared to be sustainable in the long run. Typically there are other releases from the 
ASM and this has not been the single event case. The result could be interpreted as either 
that the market is reacting to the “better than expected” quarterly result or to both the result 
and the voting change. However, we expect that the voting premium increases marginally 
after the voting change since the biggest owners power reduced marginally (Rydkvist 
Kristian, 1996). 
SKF B-share price and A-share price around the event relative to the general index is 
shown in graph 2. There seems to be market expectations built on gradually before the 
ASM21.  
The market’s perception of the governance condition of the firm is an important factor. It 
directly related to the perceived value of the firm undergone governance structure changes. 
The bigger the voting pattern changes, the larger the market reaction to the change. It 
would be prudent to say that the abnormal return experienced on the day of the 
announcement was due to partly the changes of the ownership arrangement and partly the 
first quarter report that turned out to be not as bad as the market believed. SKF had
                                                 
21 Although the threshold of passing the proposed change is unusually high: for the ASM to decide such a change of 
voting power, the proposal must be supported by two thirds of the votes given the shares represented at the ASM as 
well as by half of all A shares and nine tenth of the A shares represented at the ASM. 
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experienced large loss over 1998, but returned to profit the first quarter of 199922. In 
addition, a dividend of 2 SEK was proved by the ASM corresponding to a 61,9% fall 
comparing to the year before (i.e. 5,25 per share for the year 1997).  
Graph 2 shows the stock price movement of SKF around the event period. Note that SKF 
A shares has a negative premium over B shares at the time period of the voting changes 
(see graph 7 in attachment).  
                                                 
22 The original words of the press release commented on the first quarter report was: “the sales are still declining at the 
SKF’s main markets, the bottom of the business cycle has not yet been reached. In Asia, however, SKF sales have 
started to grow again”. 
Graph 2: the Price of SKF A, B and 
General Index in the event period
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The change was announced at the 1999 ASM, on 22nd April. An 11-day event window is 
chosen including the event day, 5-day before and after the event day. The sample period is 
250 trading days before the event window. The market reaction to the event at the event 
period conditional on the market return of the event period is tested using the market 
model. The general index of the SSE is chosen to be the bench mark index. Table 5 shows 
the abnormal return of the 11-day window and the significance of the abnormal return. 
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Table 5
The effect of voting scheme change on APRIL 22nd, 1999 
as evaluated by the sample period 250 trading days before the event period. 
11 day window
Event day
15/4 16/4 19/4 20/4 21/4 22/4 23/4 26/4 27/4 28/4 29/4 CAR
t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5
Return on SKF A shares 0,0453 0,0000 0,0236 0,0000 -0,0462 0,1129 0,0217 -0,0106 0,0323 0,0141 0,0071
Return on SKF B shares 0,0556 0,0188 0,0258 -0,0252 -0,0443 0,1197 0,0138 0,0000 0,0204 0,0000 -0,0169
Return on SSE General index -0,0159 0,0131 0,0132 -0,0168 0,0126 0,0049 -0,0016 0,0063 0,0055 -0,0068 -0,0028
AR for SKF A shares 0,0624 -0,0119 0,0116 0,0180 -0,0576 0,1091 0,0391 -0,0158 0,0279 -0,0198 0,0112 0,1744
Significance level (2,699)*** (-0,423) (0,412) (0,785) (-2,049)** (4,065)*** (1,519) (-0,582) (1,037) (-0,792) (0,437)
AR for SKF B shares 0,0726 0,0070 0,0140 -0,0073 -0,0555 0,1160 0,0304444 -0,0050 0,0162 -0,005363 -0,01285 0,1702
Significance level (3,361)*** (0,267) (0,531) (-0,338) (-2,117)** (4,626)*** (1,267) (-0,198) (0,643) (-0,231) (-0,538)
the critical value of the t distribution, two sided test, for n>100 is 1,645(10%), 1,96(5%) and  2,576(1%).
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Interpretation of the result       the market data indicates that SKF’s market capitalization 
increased during the 11 day window by 17,44% (A) and 17,02% (B) corresponding to 
1090,97 MSEK in A-shares and 1461,9 MSEK in B-shares. The total market value of SKF 
increased by 2552,87 MSEK in the selected 11 day event window. The price of B share has 
been traded above A share most of the recent history (see graph 7 in attachment).  
The underlying change implied by the altering of the voting scheme has been viewed by the 
market as positive. The reason is two-fold: there should be moderate gain in removing a 
governance hurdle, that is, giving up highly geared voting scheme. Second, the resulting 
change indicated more chance of a wider coalition within current owners and possibly an 
outside interest to establish a corner position. 
4.2 The loss of control analysis 
However, the change of the voting ownership is not significant by measures of power 
indices. Wallenberg sphere weakly dominate other parties.  
A simple voting ratio and a power indices analysis of the voting rights of the shareholders 
are presented in Table 4 and Table 6, respectively. 
Table 4: the change of the voting rights before and after the change of voting scheme in 
SKF. 
  Votes before Votes after Share Capital 
Wallenberg-sfären 33,3% 29,5% 14,7% 
Skanska 20% 17,71% 8,7% 
SPP 4,7% 4,54% 3,9% 
Nordbankens aktiefonder 4,3% 4,49% 5,4% 
Fjärde AP-fonden 4,1% 3,95% 3,3% 
AMF Försäkring AB 2,3% 2,16% 1,6% 
Skandia 1,9% 2,08% 2,7% 
*data source: Owners and power in Sweden’s listed companies. 
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Table 6
Before the change of the voting scheme After the change of the voting scheme
SKF owner name  votes Shapley 1 Shapley2   Banzhaf 1   Banzhaf2  votes Shapley 1 Shapley2   Banzhaf 1   Banzhaf2
1999 Feb. MWC=1/2 MWC=2/3 MWC=1/2 MWC=2/3 MWC=1/2 MWC=2/3 MWC=1/2 MWC=2/3
1 Wallenberg-sfären 0,333 0,6353 0,5458 0,7224 0,4555 0,295 0,577 0,5496 0,6708 0,4532
2 Skanska 0,2 0,0728 0,285 0,046 0,3854 0,177 0,0894 0,2757 0,0594 0,375
3 SPP 0,047 0,0728 0,0405 0,046 0,035 0,045 0,0761 0,0383 0,0591 0,0382
4 Nordbankens aktiefonder 0,043 0,0728 0,0351 0,046 0,0345 0,045 0,0761 0,0383 0,0591 0,0382
5 Fjärde AP-Fonden 0,041 0,0728 0,032 0,046 0,0337 0,04 0,0629 0,0322 0,0567 0,0355
6 AMF försäkring AB 0,023 0,0238 0,013 0,028 0,0156 0,022 0,025 0,0144 0,0248 0,0151
7 Skandia 0,019 0,0176 0,0114 0,02 0,0118 0,021 0,0241 0,0141 0,0231 0,0144
8 Kunskap och kompetens stift 0,012 0,0119 0,0079 0,0165 0,007 0,011 0,0145 0,0097 0,0123 0,0068
9 SHB:s aktiefonder 0,006 0,0044 0,006 0,006 0,0044 0,007 0,0123 0,0077 0,0084 0,0059
10 praktikertj pens stiftelser 0,006 0,0044 0,006 0,006 0,0044 0,006 0,0106 0,0069 0,0071 0,0052
11 Konsumentkooperationen 0,004 0,0028 0,0038 0,004 0,003 0,004 0,0081 0,0038 0,0051 0,0033
12 Merrill Lynch fonder (USA) 0,003 0,002 0,0029 0,003 0,0022 0,003 0,0069 0,0026 0,0039 0,0025
13 GMO international funds 0,003 0,002 0,0029 0,003 0,0022 0,003 0,0069 0,0026 0,0039 0,0025
14 DFA fonder 0,001 0,0007 0,0011 0,001 0,0008 0,001 0,002 0,0008 0,0012 0,0008
15 SKF:s allemonsfond 0,001 0,0007 0,0011 0,001 0,0008 0,001 0,002 0,0008 0,0012 0,0008
16 Timber hill Europe AG 0,001 0,0007 0,0011 0,001 0,0008 0 0 0 0 0
17 Norska staten 0,001 0,0007 0,0011 0,001 0,0008 0 0 0 0 0
18 UBS Schweiz Stockholm 0,001 0,0007 0,0011 0,001 0,0008 0,001 0,002 0,0008 0,0012 0,0008
19 FPG/AMFK 0,001 0,0007 0,0011 0,001 0,0008 0,001 0,002 0,0008 0,0012 0,0008
20 Förenade Liv 0,001 0,0007 0,0011 0,001 0,0008 0,001 0,002 0,0008 0,0012 0,0008
note:
1. Data source is Ägarna och Makten, 1999.
2.MWC stands for minimal winning coalition.
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The Shapley indices for simple majority voting changes from 63% to 57 %, the qualified 
majority voting power changes from 54,5% to 54,9%. Similarly, Banzhaf power indices 
change only marginally (see graph 4 and graph 5 in attachment). This means there is no 
significant loss of power due to the change of voting scheme.  
5 Concluding remark 
The voting scheme changes and the firm value are related because market price of the firm 
reacts to governance issues via expected agency cost of the firm. The magnitude of the 
change in market value depends on the market perception of the improvement towards 
better corporate governance and the actual loss of power. In these two cases, we found that 
Electrolux AB case experienced significant loss of control interest. This has lead to 
enlarged voting premium as expected. Also, no compensation was demanded from the A-
share owners’ side has a wealth transfer effect to the B-share owners.  
However, reducing the voting dominance of the controlling owner does not necessarily 
mean reducing de facto dominance. But it provides a possibility and the governance 
practice can be expected to change over time. This effect, however small, is decisive in the 
evolution of corporate control and power shifting process.  
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Appendix  
A: The standard event study methodology and its development 
 
This paper employs the market model of event study to assess the economic impact of a 
voting scheme change to the value of firm. The estimation procedure is described below. 
A standard market value framework 
For a given firm, I, we consider a date t, occurring during an event period as well as an 
estimation period containing T observations distinct from the event period. The abnormal 
return Ait for the date t is computed as  
 
 
Where the parameters of the equation are obtained using the estimation period data. Since 
 Rit=α+βRmt+εit the abnormal return in (1) can be written as 
)1(,ˆˆ LLLLmtitit RRA βα −−=
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The variance–covariance matrix of the market model coefficients is (conditioned on the 
market returns): 
 
Combining (2) and (3) gives the variance of Ait (conditioned on the market returns): 
Abnormal returns for a single firm or a cross section of firms are arranged in event time. T 
refers to the time in the event period. The significance of the abnormal return can be 
obtained by the magnitude of the abnormal return on the standard deviation of the abnormal 
return at t using (4). 
The average abnormal return in event time is computed as 
 
Then compute the test statistic: 
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Under the null hypothesis of zero abnormal return, the test statistic obey the unit normal 
distribution for large N. Each SAit is distributed Student-t with (T-2) degrees of freedom or 
unit normal for large T. 
The cumulative abnormal return over K dates during the event period is often investigated. 
It is given by  
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The test statistic is distributed unit Normal for large T. 
The above framework has become a standard one when using market model. For an early 
exposition and example of its use, see Dodd and Warner (1983). 
However, if the information or announcements are not entirely unexpected, the standard 
event study method needs to be modified and adapted accordingly.  The unexpected part of 
the information should decide the stock-price reaction of the event. This resulted a new 
branch of literature, namely, the conditional methods in event studies (see, Acharya, 1988, 
Prabhala, 1997). 
Information Structures (Prabhala, 1997): 
1, Markets know, prior to the event, that the event-related information has arrived at firm I 
(but not its exact content).  
2, Markets do not know, prior to the event, that the event-related information has arrived at 
firm i. 
3, Markets know the probability of the event-related information has arrived at firm i.   
The information effect is stronger if the markets do not know that the event-related 
information has arrived at the firm.  
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Attachment: 
 
  
                          
 
 
 
Graph 3: the Cumulative Effect of 
Voting Power of Investor AB in 
1998, Feb.
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Graph 4: Cumulative effect of voting power of 
SKF
(1999, Feb.)
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Graph 5: Cumulative effect of voting power 
after the change of voting scheme in SKF 
(1999, April)
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         Graph 6: A share premium (%) of Electrolux AB from 1983 to 2003. 
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Graph 7: A share premium of SKF AB from 1984 to 2003. 
SKF A-share Premium
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